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Network forensics enables investigation and identification of network attacks through the retrieved digital content.Theproliferation
of smartphones and the cost-effective universal data access through cloud has madeMobile Cloud Computing (MCC) a congenital
target for network attacks. However, confines in carrying out forensics in MCC is interrelated with the autonomous cloud hosting
companies and their policies for restricted access to the digital content in the back-end cloud platforms. It implies that existing
Network Forensic Frameworks (NFFs) have limited impact in the MCC paradigm. To this end, we qualitatively analyze the
adaptability of existing NFFs when applied to the MCC. Explicitly, the fundamental mechanisms of NFFs are highlighted and
then analyzed using the most relevant parameters. A classification is proposed to help understand the anatomy of existing NFFs.
Subsequently, a comparison is given that explores the functional similarities and deviations among NFFs. The paper concludes by
discussing research challenges for progressive network forensics in MCC.
1. Introduction
The latest development in IT has introduced the concept of
mobile cloud computing (MCC), in which data are stored
and applications are processed in computational clouds.
MCC is employed to mitigate problems related to battery
life, computational power, memory capacity, and processing
delays in smartphone devices [1]. Specifically, computation-
ally intensive applications are offloaded to the computational
cloud, which executes and returns the results back to the
smartphone device [2]. These applications are executed on
remote resources, such as physical and virtual machines, pro-
vided by cloud service providers (CSPs). Users are unaware
of the location where the offloaded applications are executed.
This condition implies that the execution of applications is
transparent owing to the concept of virtualization in MCC
[3–5]. However, no process in MCC is possible without
network links that connect resources within and outside
the cloud. Such network communication links in MCC are
called “network positioning,” which is divided into three
types, namely, cloud access, data center, and intercloud
networks [6]. All network positions in MCC are subject
to network attacks that affect various hosts, servers, and
data centers. Attackers access network links and perform
malicious actions on network packets to propagate adverse
effects to cloud resources. Eavesdropping, data modification,
IP address spoofing, DoS, DDoS, man-in-the-middle, and
packet content modification are examples of such attacks
[7]. Researchers have proposed several network forensic
frameworks (NFFs) to explore digital evidence and identify
the origin of attacks [8, 9], detect malicious code [10],
and monitor attackers’ activities in traditional networks [11].
However, MCC networks lack NFFs, which are necessary
given the number of attacks that occur in MCC networks.
Attackers access cloud resources through cloud access
networks and performmalicious actions inside the cloud [12].
A comprehensive approach is required to investigate such
malicious behavior by extracting legal evidence from various
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network devices and network positions in MCC, which is
only possible when a network forensics investigation (NFI)
has access to the networks ofMCC.NFI has access only to the
cloud access network and not the data center and intercloud
networks inMCC [13]. Such limitation restricts the capability
of NFI to investigate attacks and identify evidence found in
the networks inside the cloud. To address this issue, CSPs
must perform their own network forensics and identify legal
evidence. Such approach would provide forensics as a service
(FaaS) [14] toMCC users [15]. A number of current NFFs can
help CSPs adapt to MCC networks to identify vulnerabilities
and the origin of the attack [16–18]. However, comprehensive
studies on the adaptability of current NFFs toMCC networks
are rare. To our knowledge, no study has focused on the
implementation and adaptability of current NFFs to MCC
network infrastructures.
This study is motivated by the difficulty of addressing
numerous attacks [15] and the lack of NFFs for MCC
networks. It focuses on three different aspects of forensics
for MCCs, namely, (a) adaptability of current NFFs to MCC
networks, (b) provision of FaaS to MCC users, and (c) use
of current NFFs to convey information on malicious attacks
in MCC networks with only a few false-negative results. Two
reasons explain this selection. First, this selection saves time
and cost that CSPs might spend on reinventing the wheel
regarding NFFs. Second, this assortment narrows down the
scope of network forensics in MCC for a comprehensive
study of the subject. The objective of this comprehensive
review is to provide researchers with insights into the latest
ideas in current literature, adaptability of current NFFs to
MCC networks, and unresolved issues and challenges faced
by CSPs. Such review is critical given that calibration and
depiction of legal influences have yet to be considered byCSPs
and legislators.
The following are the contributions of this study.
(a) Classification of current NFFs based on their imple-
mentation.
(b) Identification of evaluation parameters for current
NFFs based on the MCC context.
(c) Analysis of current NFFs based on evaluation param-
eters that highlight similarities and differences among
NFFs.
(d) Identification of issues and challenges in deploying
NFFs to investigate cybercrimes in MCC.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical framework by explaining MCC, digital forensics,
and the significance of network forensics and positions in
MCC. Section 3 presents the overview and classification of
currentNFFs based on their implementation and explains the
anatomy of each current NFF. Section 4 presents the quali-
tative analysis of current NFFs based on selected evaluation
parameters in the context of adaptability to MCC. Existing
NFFs are also compared to highlight the similarities and
differences of their adaptability to MCC networks. Section 5
discusses related issues and challenges. Section 6 provides the
conclusion and future research directions.
2. Background
This section provides background knowledge for a compre-
hensive understanding of the rest of the paper. Digital foren-
sics is introduced, and its process models and role in MCC
are examined. MCC is also discussed in terms of its three
entity models, namely, smartphone devices, networking, and
cloud infrastructure, to provide readers with knowledge on
each part of the MCC infrastructure. The importance of
network forensics in the MCC paradigm is also discussed by
identifying the significance of NFFs for MCC networks in
detecting various vulnerabilities in such networks.
2.1. Mobile Cloud Computing. MCC is a revolutionary model
that allows mobile users to connect to computational clouds
through their smart mobile devices from anywhere at any
time [6]. MCC is a combination of smartphone devices,
wireless channels and network links, and clouds, as shown
in Figure 1. Smartphones that connect to MCC suffer from
constraints, such as limited battery life, memory, and pro-
cessing unit as well as delays in executing an application.
Such constraints prevent users from executing computation-
intensive applications on a lightweight smartphone device
[1]. To overcome these problems, different offloading mech-
anisms [19–22] have been proposed to partially or entirely
outsource the computational load of smart mobile devices.
Cloud computing also involves the combination of var-
ious resources to form data centers; users can then utilize
data center resources to compute and store applications [23].
These resources are integrated by the CSP in data centers that
merge to form a cloud [24, 25]. Clouds help smartphone users
connect to the Internet from any location. Users can connect
to cloud resources at any time; CSPs integrate the resources
of different organizations and provide a virtual environment
to facilitate smartphone use in MCC [6]. Users benefit from
the virtual resources assigned by CSP as they experience
reduced time delays, increased availability and reliability, and
proper load balancing in computation-intensive applications.
In addition, users are only charged by CSP for what they
have used in the cloud [26]. A cheaper means to utilize
the powerful resources of MCC without paying for their
infrastructure is thus provided. Cloud resources have high
storage capacities, which are utilized by smartphone users to
transfer large amounts of important data to MCC. Storing
data in the cloud prevents data loss, virus attacks, leakage, and
data alteration when an attacker gains access to a smartphone
device [6]. Many service providers, such as Amazon S3 [27],
Drop Box [28], Google Drive [29], Google Docs [30], and
http://www.SalesForce.com/ [31], allow users to store their
data in a cloud. These cloud services can be accessed by
connecting to the Internet through different networks.
Smartphones connect to 3G/4G or wireless networks,
which serve as a gateway to cloud services. These networks
are accessible and allow smartphone users to utilize network
services that connect them to MCC from any location.
Smartphones also have integratedWi-Fi chipsets that connect
such devices to wireless networks, which are also called 802.11
networks [1]. A smartphone can join a wireless network when
it is within range of an access point to detect the signal.
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Figure 1: Mobile cloud computing basic network architecture.
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Figure 2: Digital forensics process model.
A wireless network is the simplest and most inexpensive
means to connect smartphones to MCC via the Internet.
However, using wireless networks to connect to the Internet
and MCC presents certain constraints related to power
assignment [32], load balancing [33], channel assignment
[34], and secure communication [35]. Moreover, wireless
communication involves weak encryption techniques [35]
and thus allows an attacker to exploit networks mostly
through DoS and DDoS attacks. Many smartphone users
are unaware of such attacks and the vulnerability of wireless
networks and are thus likely to be victimized by various
attackers.
The MCC model is composed of different types of
networks, including cloud access, data center, and intercloud
networks. However, data center and intercloud networks are
inaccessible to NFI in its investigation of various cybercrimes
that occur in an MCC network. Security breaches in MCC
networks require comprehensive NFFs to overcome various
network susceptibilities.Theprobability of an attack increases
as networks continually evolve, and the network forensics
process must be mandatory to identify and prevent cyber-
attacks. The following section explains the fundamentals of
digital forensic mechanisms.
2.2. Digital Forensics. Digital devices are vulnerable to secu-
rity breaches [36]. Hackers employ malware and spyware
to exploit the security flaws of smartphone devices [37].
Malware and spyware are malicious codes that allow an
attacker to spy on user activities through smartphone data,
such as email, calls, Internet browsing, SMS, and GPS
location. Attackers eavesdrop on users’ conversation through
malware and spyware software [37]. Digital forensics is
employed to investigate cyberattacks and malicious codes
that affect digital devices, particularly smartphones devices
in the MCC paradigm. Evidence from digital artifacts is
identified to investigate the malicious behaviors of attackers
[38], including monitoring, altering, deleting, inserting, and
copying user data on digital devices. The malicious behav-
iors of attackers compromise the confidential credentials of
users by damaging their privacy [39]. Several models of
the digital forensics process have been proposed to conduct
digital investigation in different research aspects, such as law
enforcement, military operations, and business and industry
[38, 40–45].
A digital forensics process model requires four steps
to conduct the investigation; these steps are acquisition,
identification, evaluation, and admission. These steps are
integrated to obtain digital evidence from digital artifacts,
which are then presented in court [46]. Alternatively, these
steps were modified into five steps, namely, preservation,
collection, examination, analysis, and presentation, in [40].
The first harmonized digital forensic investigation model
was developed by integrating existing iterative and multitier
models [47] to perform efficient digital investigation under
legal terms and conditions.TheNational Institute of Standard
and Technology explains the digital forensic process in
their report by proposing four steps, namely, collection,
examination, analysis, and reporting, as shown in Figure 2
[48].
The collection phase is the initial stage, wherein digital
evidence is collected fromdigital artifacts.This stage is crucial
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because collecting incorrect data in this step results in errors
in the subsequent stages. The examination phase focuses
on the significance of the data to the digital investigation
process. The data collected are stored in a memory storage
device or a portable drive that allows data to be transferred
without altering the format and losing the integrity of the
data [49].The next phase analyzes the data to identify various
vulnerabilities and the malicious behavior of the attacker as
well as determine the origin of the attack. The analysis is
performed with several digital forensic tools, such as EnCase
[50], FTK [51], Sleuth Kit [52], and Helix [53]. These tools
identify digital evidence extracted from temporary, deleted,
and register files as well as from cache, cookies, email, and
metadata present in digital devices [54, 55]. Such digital evi-
dence acts as proof against attackers in court by presenting a
complete and accurate investigation report.The investigation
report is the final phase of digital forensics. All the activities
performed by forensic investigators in the preceding stages
present a complete picture of the investigation process in
terms of a legal document.
Digital forensics is fast becoming a hot topic in MCC.
The demand for digital forensics in MCC continues to
increase because of the increasing number of attacks, such
as DoS, DDoS, and botnets [5, 15, 56, 57]. The origin of
attackers must be investigated to stop these attackers from
performing further malicious acts. Such investigation in
MCC requires a comprehensive digital forensics strategy to
perform data collection and examination through virtual
situations, live forensics, evidence segregation, and proactive
preparation mechanism [58]. The rapid progression and
increasing attractiveness of MCC necessitate the establish-
ment of digital forensics in the cloud environment. Novel
investigation techniques are required to prevent cybercrimes
in MCC. However, several challenges in MCC, such as access
to the entire cloud, jurisdictional issues, and technological
advancement, create problems in forensics investigation [13].
Nevertheless, such situation also creates opportunities to
establish standards, policies, and procedures in cloud-based
forensics.
2.3. Network Forensics in Mobile Cloud Computing. Cloud
services in MCC are acquired by smartphone users by
connecting through Wi-Fi, WLAN, 3G/4G, and long-term
evolution networks [1]. These networks have to be fast and
secure enough to send user requests to computational clouds
and send the results back to smartphone users. However,
these networks are targeted by attackers to gain access to the
network in the form of a network breach [59]. The current
security solution involves the use of intrusion detection
systems (IDS) and firewalls to detect and identify attack
patterns [12]. However, intelligent attacks circumvent such
security solutions to propagate malicious activities in the
network [60]. Thus, security solutions should be sufficiently
intelligent to detect intelligent attacks that compromise the
system [61].
The network forensics process identifies attacks while
monitoring and analyzing network traffic. Network forensics
delivers two types of services in the investigation process.
First, it detects intrusion and malicious traffic [61]. Second, it
collects and analyzes network traffic by performing traceback
[16], using attack graphs, and parsing voice over IP (VoIP)
[62] in a converged network. Collecting network traffic
from high-bandwidth network channels restricts network
forensics from capturing large amounts of network traffic,
particularly in MCC. High-bandwidth networks pass mil-
lions of network packets per second and require a large
storage capacity to store network packets for further analysis.
One option is to use the storage services of cloud data centers
to store and access large amounts of data [63]. Large amounts
of data are mostly generated in smartphones through the
use of multimedia data applications, such as video chat
(Skype), video uploading or downloading (YouTube), audio
traffic (iPlayer), and online games. Most of the multimedia
traffic are based on real time and must flow quickly and
securely to perform accurate communication. To capture
multimedia traffic, live forensics technique [64] is required
to identify vulnerabilities in the network flow on a real-time
basis. Live forensics technique is utilized to capture volatile
network traffic that can be eliminated with the power off
or on arrival of new network traffic. Volatile data must be
captured in network communication for two main reasons.
First, network packets pass through different ports and reach
their destination without being stored at the destination.
Second, attackers reach the compromised system, collect
confidential data, and delete trace outs. Network forensics
must be conducted at live data communication to address
these problems [65]. However, this approach incorporates the
overheads of highly computational processors, I/O devices,
and large storage devices for collecting, analyzing, and storing
real-time network traffic. Such overheads are minimized by
collecting data only at peak hours when capturing attacks
is also likely to be achieved [66]. The processing time and
storage load can then be reduced, and precise results can
be obtained in the forensics investigation. The rest of the
network links that are inaccessible for real-time network
investigation has to be searched to identify attack patterns
that would assist in tracing the origin of the attack.
The significance of network forensics is in each part
of the MCC’s network communication channels. Malicious
behavior in network packets needs to be traced through NFF
whether a smartphone user is connected to mobile clouds
or data centers are interconnected or linked to other cloud
data centers. NFIs have limited access to investigate different
network susceptibilities [13]; thus, network forensics should
become a permanent service to MCC users through cloud
network channels and resources.
2.4. Network Positions in Mobile Cloud Computing. Network
position shows the location of the network that connects two
entities in MCC. Three types of networks generally exist in
MCC: cloud access, data center, and intercloud networks [6],
as shown in Table 1. Cloud access network is the network
that connects smartphone devices and the cloud through the
Internet [67]. This network is utilized when a smartphone
user connects to the cloud to offload and download an
application to the cloud [76].However, connection difficulties
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Table 1: Generalized network positions in MCC.
Network positioning Entities link Example Objective Accessibility
Cloud access network [67, 68] User↔ cloud services Internet, NGN, 4G Dynamic routing,accessibility to cloud Possible
Data center network [69] Data center↔ data center Cluster computing
Load balancing,
virtualization, intensive
computing
CSP
Inter cloud network [70] Cloud system↔ cloud system Cloud resourcemigration Cloud collaboration CSP
Table 2: Description of network positioning in MCC.
Cloud access network Data center network (DCN) Intercloud network
Connects smartphone user to cloud system
through wireless, ratio access network
(RAN), 3G/4G and LTE networks [4].
DCN connects application software &
cluster of computers within data center [70].
Connects two or more cloud systems for
cloud collaboration [68]
Public cloud networking makes availability
of network applications to users via internet
[71].
Its network expands towards connecting two
or more data centers with a single cloud
system [70]
It not only connects two cloud systems but
provides additional functionality such as
data format conversions, network
virtualization, service availability, address
management, intelligent routing, and
efficient security [72].
It faces challenges related to security,
compliance, privacy, and high availability
[71].
It maintains low cost with maximizing
efficiency and throughput [71]
It benefits by connecting with one cloud
system and acquires its services, dedicated
network, and increase transfer speed
through protocol optimization [73].
RAN lacks centralize organization for
emerging heterogeneous networks,
flexibility to drift network services towards
network verge for new application
utilization and generate revenue from it [74].
Mostly faces two challenges such as
scalability and cost effectiveness. Scalability
depends on architectural design of DCN
while cost depends on its power
consumption [75].
related to security, compliance, privacy, and high availability
exist. The cloud itself is composed of data centers, and a
data center is a combination of resources. The network that
connects all resources within a single data center or the net-
work that combines one or more data centers is called “data
center network,” which in turn involves intra- and interdata
center networks [69]. Data center networks are employed in
the cloud when data are transferred from one resource to
another or to other data center resources within the cloud
for execution, such as for cluster computing. Scalability and
cost effectiveness are the two issues related to this network
[69]. Scalability depends on the architectural design, and cost
effectiveness depends on the power consumption of a data
center network [77].
The connecting network between two or more clouds is
called intercloud network [70]. Such network deploys a fiber
optics network that has high bandwidth and high-speed line
rate. Intercloud network is used when one cloud migrates
or sends an application to another cloud for execution or
storage. Intercloud network provides a dedicated network
and increases transfer speed through protocol optimization.
A brief description of each network position in MCC is
presented in Table 2. All network positions in MCC are
considered vulnerable to attacks in NFFs. No network is
safe from an attack because of vulnerabilities, which require
further investigation to determine the origin of the attack [8].
Network forensics has a vital function in investigating
networks to identify legal evidence on cyberattacks [16].
Network attacks performed on traditional networks can
be easily investigated by obtaining legal evidence through
current NFFs [71]. Such networks are accessible and allow
for immediate investigation. However, data center and inter-
cloud networks in MCC are inaccessible to third-party NFIs
because these networks are the sole property of CSPs.The lack
of third-party access limits the investigation of NFIs on cloud
networks [13]. The best option is for CSPs to conduct their
own network investigation and provide FaaS to users, which
also generates additional revenue. Almost all networks within
the cloud territory are accessible to CSPs; network attacks
can be easily investigated, and legal evidence can be obtained.
Moreover, MCC users would find it easy to trust the data and
believe that such data are safe from third-party NFIs [72].
3. Network Forensic Frameworks
The classification of NFFs based on an exhaustive literature
review is presented in the first part of this section. Such
classification is derived from the implementation of the archi-
tectural frameworks of network forensics, which narrows
down the scope and allows for a comprehensive study of
the area. NFFs are classified into five categories, namely,
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traceback NFFs, converged networks, intrusion detection
systems, attack graphs, and distributive frameworks.
In the second part of this section, the structural aspect
of current NFFs is discussed in detail by reviewing its
frameworks, approach, methods, evaluation, limitations, and
output performance. A complete operational overview of
each NFF and its implementation objectives is presented.
3.1. Overview and Classification of Network Forensics Frame-
works. Network forensics aims to identify legal evidence
from network traffic to investigate the origin of the attack
and attacker behavior [8]. NFFs capture and analyze network
traffic in the network to investigate attacks performed by dif-
ferent attackers [16]. NFFs extract information from network
traffic to rebuild emails, messages, FTP traffic, and various
other communications. The process helps NFIs reconstruct
the attack path and determine the attack’s origin [62]. Tradi-
tional networks can readily access breached network devices
and acquire data for investigation. However, accessing and
acquiring legal evidence from breached devices in MCC are
difficult because of the CSPs’ resource property and virtual
resource infrastructure [3]. NFIs are unable to initiate the
investigation process without access to network resources in
the cloud. Network data integrity inMCC is another concern
[49]. Anyone can access cloud resources and alter user data,
resulting in the loss of data integrity. Frequent data migration
within various clouds can also affect data integrity because
of the storage of data in different formats and in different
databases. Privacy is also an issue in the investigation ofMCC
networks because user information could be disclosed when
a malicious activity is investigated [72]. User data traveling in
the network at the same time further complicates efforts to
capture malicious user data among various users, especially
in high-speed data rate networks in MCC. Each network
link might contain millions of user data simultaneously.
Thus, identifying a specific user’s data without disturbing
that of the others is difficult. Real-time analysis is also a
challenging task in MCC because the NFI cannot access
cloud networks [74]. Such analysis is important because
network data are volatile. Network data might lose their
identity after being overwritten by other data, and closing
the session could allow attackers to alter the data and delete
attack traces from the network. In business, health, and other
industries, real-time analysis is necessary to handlemalicious
situations occurring in the environment. Current network
forensic tools lack the capability to capture, record, and
analyze high-speed line rate data at various channels of MCC
networks [58, 75]. An intelligent network forensics tool that is
compatible with the virtual and disseminated environment of
MCCnetworks is thus essential. Moreover, high bandwidth is
necessary to acquire legal evidence from different locations
in MCC [73]. Acquiring data from a remote cloud data
center network requires a dedicated bandwidth to execute
the process quickly and respond to user queries in real
time. Traditional networks are simpler than MCC networks
because of the former’s access to resources; such access allows
for the use of less bandwidth with quick incident responses.
A chain of custody for network evidence is also important for
Table 3: Issues in current network forensics and MCC network
forensics.
Issues Currentnetwork forensics
MCC
network forensics
Data acquisition [79] No Yes
Access to artifacts [79, 80] No Yes
Bandwidth utilization [73] No Yes
Chain of custody [14, 74, 75] No Yes
Data Integrity [74] No Yes
Privacy [81, 82] No Yes
Real time Analysis [74] No Yes
Volatile data [83, 84] No Yes
Forensics tools [14, 75, 79] No Yes
the MCC environment. Each event in the MCC network has
to be validated, particularly as to how and where the data are
stored on cloud resources while maintaining their integrity
[75, 78]. Chain of custody has to be defended in court to
present evidence against the attacker. Tracing each event
while preserving its integrity and reliability is a challenge
because of virtualized and distributed environments in MCC
and the incorporation of datamigration. A comparison of the
status of issues regarding current network forensics andMCC
network forensics is presented in Table 3. A comprehensive
review is required to explain the aforementioned problems
in current NFFs and illustrate deliberate compatibility with
MCC networks.
NFFs can be classified into five categories, namely, trace-
backNFFs, converged networks, intrusion detection systems,
attack graphs, and distributive frameworks.This classification
is based on an exhaustive literature review. Traceback NFFs
[8, 9, 16, 71, 85] identify the origin of the malicious packet
in the network generated during a cyberattack. Traceback
NFFs are utilized to determine the source of the packet
generation [86] and eventually lead to the identification of
attackers based on their source IP address.Moreover, NFFs in
converged networks distinguish evidence from audio, video,
and multimedia data [62, 87, 88]. Converged networks are
prone to attacks because of their flaws in communication
[89, 90]. In this study, NFFs for converged networks are
only demonstrated for VoIP traffic. NFFs identify evidence
from voice packets altered by attackers during their attack
on the network. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are also
employed to detect and log malicious packets generated by
attackers [91–94]. IDSs are utilized to check packets based
on provided rules and knowledge obtained by performing
pattern matching at the time of capture. Packets are logged
through hash functions and sent to the forensics server for
further analysis. Furthermore, NFFs employ attack graphs
to identify attack paths in the network. Attack graphs help
reconstruct attacks by determining the activities performed
by an attacker during the attack [17, 95–99]. Such a graph
refines the attack scenario by studying its sequential steps
from the origin of the packet to the victim node in the
network. Distributive NFFs are utilized to identify malicious
packets in disseminated networks by capturing them from
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different locations [18, 100–102]. Distributive NFFs elimi-
nate the bottleneck problem, which often results in high
bandwidth consumption and long delays. Table 4 shows the
classification of NFFs.The function of eachNFF is illustrated.
3.2. Structure of Network Forensics Frameworks. This section
discusses the structure of NFFs based on their approach,
method, evaluation, limitations, and performance. The
approach attribute presents the techniques employed byNFFs
to conduct the investigation. Such techniques include logging
[8], packet marking [9], spread spectrum [85], probabilistic
model [17], dynamic forensics intrusion tolerance [92], foren-
sics examination [97], distributive network forensics [100],
and visualization and interaction [99] for various NFFs.
Logging is utilized to record network traffic and its
patterns in the form of log files to obtain evidence on various
attacks [8, 16, 18, 62, 71, 87, 88, 93, 94, 101, 102].This technique
captures network traffic at different routers and performs a
hashing function on it. Log files are usually applied by a hash
function that validates the files’ integrity; such files can be
accessed later for the investigation of several attacks. Packet
marking is an approach utilized to mark packets at the router
to trace packet movement in the network, which is vital
for tracing back the origin of an attack [9, 71, 101]. Packet
marking is commonly adopted by traceback frameworks
[9, 71] to identify the attacker’s source address, which they
often spoof. Spread spectrum techniques are employed to
traceback the origin of the attack, detect attacks, and identify
receiver status by spreading signals with a frequency in a
domain of a bandwidth [85]. A probabilistic model measures
the uncertainty present in the attacked networks to obtain
digital evidence [17, 91].Dynamic forensic intrusion tolerance
performs in a situation where a forensics server is affected
by an attacker [92]. It provides real-time tolerance to the
server and analyzes network traffic. Forensics examination is
implemented to examine log files altered by attackers during
an attack to guard against investigation [97]. Distributive
network forensics collects network logs from distributed
agents in disseminated networks and analyzes the logs locally
or centrally through forensics servers [100]. Visualization and
interaction approach makes the entire attack graph easy to
analyze and allows network investigators to examine various
attack paths through human-computer interaction interfaces
[99].
The method attribute demonstrates how different
approaches are employed to identify evidence in the
network. Similar to the approach attribute, each NFF uses
certain methods as shown in Table 5. Authenticated evidence
marking scheme reduces the overhead in the entire network
performance by parsing data at edge routers; the authenticity
and integrity of network data are thus improved [71].
Lightweight IP traceback method utilizes the time-to-live
(TTL) packet field of an IP header to trace packets for
investigation [9]. Scalable network forensics traces back
the origin of the attack based on attack traffic separated
from normal traffic in traces provided over a long period
of time [16]. Hopping-based spread spectrum traces back
cybercrimes in anonymous network communication by
providing security and accuracy to such communication
[85]. The IP traceback method employs a sinkhole router,
a compressed hash table, and data mining approaches for
network forensics analysis to determine the origin of the
attack [8].
VoIP forensics network patterns are utilized in VoIP
network traffic to collect and analyze voice packets systemat-
ically. The technique helps identify, detect, and trace attacks
by generating patterns for such attacks [87]. VoIP network
forensics also identifies digital evidence on various attacks
by comparing normal and abnormal packets of the network.
Suchmethod reduces human intervention by collecting voice
packets through sensors installed at various parts of the net-
work [88]. A VoIP evidence model reconstructs attack events
by applying secure temporal logic of action (S-TLA+), which
works when it lacks sufficient information to investigate an
attack [62]. This model also provides reliability and integrity
for the collected information, validates the authenticity of
the provided evidence, and allows NFIs to capture unknown
attacks undetected by other network forensics methods.
Probabilistic discovery and inference method is utilized
by IDS to reveal unknown information related to the analysis
of network traffic [91]. The method is only applicable to
network-based IDS and not to application-based IDS. Such
probabilistic method aids in forensics explanation, which is
based on unreported signature rules and observed network-
based IDS alerts. Moreover, formal methods are employed
to show that a forensics server is sufficiently tolerant and
thus works even if it is subjected by several attacks [92]. The
availability of the forensics server is enhanced by collecting
significant evidence. Steganography is also utilized to conceal
original log files from an attacker. Logs are converted into
images and are hidden from the attacker. The conversion
is performed by changing the least significant bit for each
pixel without being visible to the naked eye [93].The original
log files are kept in the custody of NFIs, which then trace
attacks by monitoring copied log files for alteration. Network
forensics architecture is applied to performmultidimensional
forensic analysis based on log messages and network data
[94]. Network traffic is monitored at the time of network
entry, and log data are recorded and analyzed as data move
out from various security devices. This twofold monitoring
and analysis technique ensures the reliability and credibility
of evidence extraction through network traffic.
Scalable analysis [95] is performed to measure the effect
of current and future attacks in large-scale networks. Large
amounts of network traffic are analyzed in real time by
measuring the effect of a single attack on the enterprise and
its correlation to other attacks [95]. Moreover, a multilevel
and multilayer attack tree identifies the system level risk by
analyzing various security threads resulting from various net-
work attacks [96]. It helps NFIs become familiar with future
network threats. Antiforensics method can be incorporated
with attack graphs to trace attackers based on their activities.
Antiforensics method urges attackers to perform malicious
actions while being monitored [97]. In addition, a fuzzy
cognitive map can be incorporated with a genetic algorithm
to identify the worst attack path among a large number of
attacks present in the network [98] and help NFIs track and
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Table 4: Classification of network forensics frameworks.
Frameworks Functions
Traceback
NFEA [71]
Proposes effective tracking range to provide admissible digital evidence with guarantee of
integrity and authenticity of track data. Further, it marks packets at edge router which
increase efficiency and decrease loss of data.
LWIP [9]
Considers only time to live (TTL) field of IP header to trace out attack path in DDoS attacks.
It used three algorithms that address three steps to make proposed scheme efficient, robust,
and simple such as (a) embeds TTL value in IP header, (b) performed soon as DDoS attack
occur, and (c) attack tree analysis algorithms is executed.
Scalable NF [16]
Proposes scalable network forensics scheme for stealthy self-propagating attacks to
traceback the origin of attack. Moreover, scheme is scalable in terms of computational time
and space to accurately discover origin of attack. In addition, data reduction mechanism is
used to identify deviations of each host and it acts as indication for a potential attack which
is further process for forensics investigation.
HB-SST [85]
Presents generic hopping based spread spectrum technique for network forensics traceback
in anonymous communication networks. It provides randomized effect to mark network
traffic in both time and frequency domains.
ITP [8]
A protocol is design to traceback attacks in real time as well as periodically using
compressed hash table in the router. Further, it addresses replay attacks through timestamp
attached to the messages and its integrity is verified through using hash function. Moreover,
it enhances detection rate of attacks by updating attack list periodically in routers.
Converged network
PBNF [87] Proposes VoIP network forensics patterns that use to collect and analyze voice traffic in asystematic way.
VoIP-NFDE [88]
A digital evidence procedure for VoIP network forensics is proposed especially for internet
phone. Evidence is identified by comparing normal and abnormal packets in voice
communication.
VoIPEM [62]
Model based forensics method is proposed to identify malicious attacks in VoIP
communication that formalize hypothesis through information gathering. Moreover, attack
path is reconstructed by adapting secure temporal logic of action (S-TLA+) which provide
clear evidence about attacks.
Intrusion detection system
AIDF [91]
An analytical intrusion detection framework proposed, based on probability model
discovery approach & inference mechanism. It provides forensics explanation not only on
intrusion alerts, but also on unidentified signature rules. Moreover, it integrates intrusion
alerts from disseminated IDS sensors.
DFITM [92]
Intrusion tolerance base dynamic forensics modeling is performed to enhance availability of
forensics server in case of an attack. Modeling is conducted with finite state machine and
forensics server availability is analyzed through numerical analysis.
IIFDH [93]
Steganography is applied to identify alteration in log files performed by an intruder after his
malicious attack. It maintains reliability and completeness of the evidence for future
decisions.
NFIDA [94] Network forensics based on intrusion detection static and dynamic analysis is performed toprovide complete record of data and logs while ensuring credibility and reliability.
Attack graphs
SA [95]
Proposes a framework that performs scalable analysis of attack scenarios by analyzing
massive amount of alerts in real-time situation. Moreover, it also addresses individual
attacks and its impacts on the enterprise.
MLL-AT [96] It identifies multistage network attacks and analyzes system risk by evaluating varioussecurity threads that occurs due to attack sequences.
AGFE [97] Integrates antiforensics mechanism with attack graph to fully observe intruders whiledeleting certain traces after attack performed.
FCM [98]
Generate fuzzy cognitive map from attack graph with the help of genetic algorithm to find a
worst attacks in the network. It simples a situation for network investigator to tackle such
attacks with great concern.
CSBH [17]
A probabilistic approach is proposed that integrates attack graph with hidden Markov
model for exploring system states and its observation. It identifies the root cause of attack
with providing automation, adaptability, and scalability in large network for cost benefit
security hardens.
AGVI [99] RAVEN framework is proposed that reduces sophistication in large attack graphs byproviding interactive visualize interfaces for user to illustrate attack graphs easily.
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Table 4: Continued.
Frameworks Functions
Distributive
ForNet [100]
Proposes distributive framework to collect network logs from different network devices in
disseminated network. It analyze IP packet header for IP connection, ports, and various
sessions through bloom filter tracking.
DRNIFS [101]
It captures network packets soon as an attack is detected in a real-time situation. Moreover,
it collects potential evidences that are deleted in most of the cases by intruders after its
malicious attacks. It uses centralize network forensics server with disseminative detective
agents.
DCNFM [102]
Proposes framework that identifies potential risk, misbehavior of packets, and origin of
attack with having distributed cooperative network forensics system. The system is
comprised of client server architecture, with client agents installed on different system to
capture network traffic logs from different network artifacts.
DNF-IA [18]
It proposes artificial intelligence immunity theory to address network forensics in real time
with keeping evidence in a safe way. It provides validity, integrality, and authenticity for
evidence in a real time situation.
reveal attacks that have theworst effect on the network. Raven
architecture is utilized to visualize and interact with attack
paths in the attack graph [99]. The situation of attack graphs
is simplified; thus, NFIs can easily understand several attack
paths in the network.
Likewise, distributive architecture is utilized to inves-
tigate network packets according to the IP connections,
port records, and various session creations between hosts;
bloom filter tracking is adopted in this architecture to collect
evidence against attackers [100].This investigation procedure
provides comprehensive information against attackers by
extracting evidence from various events in the network.
Other distributive network forensic architectures are utilized
to produce rapid responses in the generation of the attacks
while investigating network traffic and logs dynamically [101].
The problem of static analysis is addressed, and time delays
in incident response are reduced. Client server architecture
is utilized to identify potential risks, misbehavior of packets,
and origin of the attack [102]. It captures data from dis-
tributed locations, converts traffic into a database, analyzes
network attacks, and produces visual reports by performing
a statistical analysis of the entire process. The dynamic
network forensic model simplifies the situation by providing
authentic, integral, and valid digital evidence collected from
distributed locations in the network [18]. Agents installed at
distributed locations capture raw network traffic and apply
antigenic presentation coding on it.This condition helpsNFIs
collect real-time evidence on network attacks.
The evaluation attribute in Table 5 represents the tech-
niques employed by NFFs to analyze frameworks. Different
NFFs employ various methods to evaluate the framework.
These methods include test bed [71, 88, 91, 97], simulation
[8, 71, 85, 98], tree analysis algorithm [9], S-TLC+ [62], finite
state machine [92], prototyped [93], synthetic & real attack
graph [95], case studies [96], and many other scenarios [17].
The limitation attribute reveals the shortcomings ofNFFs that
affect the entire network forensics process as the investigation
is performed. These shortcomings include computational
overhead [71, 94, 95], storage overhead [71, 92, 96, 101],
router overhead [8, 9], capturing real time network traffic
[16], scalability [85, 87, 93, 96, 97], time consuming [88],
bandwidth utilization [88], forensics server bottle neck [18,
87, 102], observation depended [98], lack of awareness [98],
and specific attack investigation [100]. Table 5 also presents
the output derived from evaluating NFFs based on their
evaluation values in the performance attribute.
4. Review of Network Forensics Frameworks
in the Context of Adaptability to MCC
This section highlights the parameters used for evaluating
adaptability of existing NFFs inMCC networks.The parame-
ters include scalability, overhead, accuracy, complexity, and
privacy. Most of the NFFs discussed in the review deal
with capturing the network packets from networks, followed
by the analysis phase on forensics servers. In case of large
distributed networks, forensic servers should scale to ana-
lyze huge amount of network traffic. In particular, existing
NFFs must support network forensics by collecting network
evidences from various distributed networks connectingmil-
lions of MCC resources. Therefore, NFFs must scale in order
to collect, preserve, analyze, and report network evidence
in MCC in a real-time. The overhead of existing NFFs is
required to be minimal in terms of (a) computation and
(b) storage. Computational resources are required to analyze
huge amount of networked data to extract sources of evi-
dence. On the other hand, this data is also stored in a system
that has to be analyzed later by various forensicsmechanisms.
The accuracy attribute forNFFs is vital tomeasure filtration of
irrelevant network traffic for analysis of evidence. Extraction
of significant data from the network is important inMCCdue
to restricted access to the cloud data. High accuracy results
in less time for analysis of data and producing quick incident
response. The complexity of existing NFFs can be analyzed
forMCC networks in terms of its implementation, collection,
investigation, and analysis. It implies that it is difficult to
apply existing NFFs in MCC networks due to inaccessibility
of cloud network, virtualization, and distributed networks.
The privacy is considered as one of the most important issues
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Table 5: Structure of network forensics frameworks.
Frameworks Approach Methods Evaluation Limitations Performance
Traceback
NFEA [71] LO, PM
Authenticated
evidence marking
scheme (AEMS)
Test bed &
Simulation
Computational &
Storage overhead
50% performance
degrades when AEMS
applied to each
packet. However,
performance gains
40% when it is applied
to only select packets.
LWIP [9] PM
Lightweight IP
traceback based on
TTL
Tree analysis
algorithm Router overhead
Significant path
reconstruction in
DDoS attack
Scalable-NF [16] LO Scalable networkforensics
Real world
traffic traces
Capture real time
traffic
Reduce 97% of
irrelevant data for
analysis
HB-SST [85] Spread spectrumtechniques
Hopping based
spread spectrum Simulation Scalability
False positive
decrease exponential
with increase in signal
length.
ITP [8] LO IP tracebackprotocol (ITP) Simulation Router overhead
ITP shows better
results in term of false
positive rate & attack
detection as
comparing with
existing frameworks
Converge
network
PBNF [87] LO VoIP networkforensics patterns
Suggest to use
NFATs
Scalability,
Forensics server
bottle neck
Faster and structural
investigation in VoIP
traffic
VoIP-NFDE
[88] LO
VoIP network
forensics with
digital evidence
Test bed
Time consuming,
bandwidth
utilization
Collects, analyzes,
and performs
forensics in VoIP
DEFSOP operational
stage
VoIPEM [62] LO VoIP EvidenceModel S-TLC+
Not trace
anonymous attacks
Identifies significant
information relate to
attacks
Intrusion
detection system
AIDF [91] Probabilistic model
Probabilistic
discovery &
inference
Test bed Database foruntreated data
Perfect discovery
results in 16.67% and
information
combining from
multiple IDS for
forensics explanation
is 87%
DFITM [92] Dynamic forensicsintrusion tolerance Formal methods
Finite state
machine Storage overhead
Enhancement of
availability of
forensics server with
improvement of
collected significant
evidence
IIFDH [93] LO Steganography Prototyped Scalability
Real-time detection
with preservation of
evidence
NFIDA [94] LO Multi-dimensionalanalysis Not applicable
Computational
overhead
Records complete
network data with
providing data
integrity that results
in network forensics
solution based on
intrusion detection
analysis.
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Table 5: Continued.
Frameworks Approach Methods Evaluation Limitations Performance
Attack graph
(AG)
SA [95] Measure current &future attacks Scalable analysis
Synthetic & real
AG
Computational
overhead
For large graph the
integer value 𝑘
increases when
processing time
increase. However it
remains stable for
small graphs
MLL-AT [96] Network attackmodeling
Multi-level & layer
attack tree Case study
Scalability, Storage
overhead
Model attack more
accurately, address
system risk
AGFE [97] Forensicsexamination
Anti-forensics
injection in AG Test bed Scalability
Identifies alteration
performed by
intruders in log files.
FCM [98] Network securityevaluation
finite cognitive
map & genetic
algorithm
Simulation
Observation
depended, lack of
awareness
Results best fit value
of 1.64 that shows the
probability of goal
achieved.
CSBH [17] Probabilistic Design model Scenario based Computationaloverhead
It finds that an
approach is user
centric, with
complexity O (MN2).
AGVI [99] Visualization &Interaction RAVEN Not applicable
Visualization in
real time situation
Address impact of
HCI techniques on
attack graphs
Distributive
ForNet [100] distributivenetwork forensics Architecture Not applicable
Limited attack
detection due to
lightweight
filtering
Provide valuable,
trustworthy
information about
network events
DRNIFS [101] LO, PM Architecture Not applicable Storage overhead
Real time detection
with quick incident
response
DCNFM [102] LO Client ServerArchitecture Not applicable
Forensics server
bottle neck,
Storage overhead
Identifies origin of
attack and potential
risk
DNF-IA [18] LO Dynamic networkforensics model Laboratory test
Lack of
cryptography,
forensics server
bottle neck
Integrated, accurate
results in real-time
situation when attacks
are occurred.
Approaches: LO: logging; PM: packet marking.
for MCC nowadays. User migration towards the cloud must
ensure the data integrity and safety fromunauthorized access.
Privacy in NFF is significantly different as compared to the
MCC. Therefore, applicability of NFFs in MCC must be
evaluated in terms of privacy.
4.1. Evaluation Parameters for the Analysis of NFFs. Scala-
bility is an important MCC parameter [103]. Scalability is
enabled by the concept of virtualization in different entities,
such as servers, data centers, resources, operating systems,
and networks. Scalability in terms of networks maximizes
throughput, improves performance, and ensures availability
and reliability [104]. Increased network scalability enhances
data mobility, which ultimately demands more monitoring
and analysis features in the context of network forensics.
Therefore, NFFs are a vital part of MCC to investigate net-
work links and devices that scale according to the demands.
Moreover, current NFFs [16–18, 99] can integrate features
with attack patterns and security devices to investigate
network traffic for MCC. Scalability can be regarded from
two perspectives: horizontal and vertical scalability for MCC
[105].
Horizontal scalability is also called “scale out”; it deals
with system throughput by enhancing its complexity. Hori-
zontal scalability increases the number of counts in terms of
hardware resources and performs tasks more quickly [106].
The scope of horizontal scalability for MCC is mainly a
result of disseminated networks that combine different data
centers within and out of the cloud. The capacity of network
forensic servers has to be sufficiently large to capture, record,
and analyze network traffic from several network links and
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devices in the cloud environment. For instance, one forensic
server may be used for one trillion packets instead of using
two or more forensic servers for the same number of packets
for investigation [92]. Sending network packets through the
shortest path to their destination reduces the number of
hop counts and thus helps NFIs easily capture and analyze
network packets with less time delay and increased system
throughput.
Vertical scalability is known as “scale up.” It handles
the improvement of the existing functions and features of
a system by adding more hardware [105]. For instance,
adding extra processors or memory in a network forensic
server executes and stores more network packets with less
time delay. Similarly, network speed and bandwidth can
be enhanced to provide an efficient response to MCC user
queries. NFFs attain efficiency by investigatingmore network
packets within the same time frame. However, upgrading
network resources does not always produce sound results
because of diminishing returns that increase with a decrease
in the performance rate. For this reason, one has to identify
other factors to incorporate with scalability to produce
effective network forensic outputs. Nevertheless, the vertical
scalability of NFFs in MCC is important because of its rapid
incident response to identifying the criminal behavior of
attackers at the time of the attack. Most current NFFs lack
such scalability, which needs to be adopted to meet the
objectives in MCC [8, 71, 87, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97].
Overhead is related to the sophistication of NFFs and
reduces the performance of the system. Network forensic
overhead includes computational and storage overheads.
These two overheads are calculated for MCC based on
existing NFFs.The computational overhead of NFFs includes
network processing, bandwidth delays, packet marking, pre-
serving, analyzing, collecting data, investigating, logging, and
integrating overheads [8, 9, 71, 97].These factors are incorpo-
rated into the computational overhead attribute that degrades
the computation of the system.The storage overhead of NFFs
deals with network traffic storage at different locations and
devices in the disseminated networks of MCC [8, 71].
Computational overhead (Co) is high for NFFs in MCC
when a framework utilizes many resources for its com-
putation, employs a less reliable investigation mechanism,
and addresses irrelevant data, resulting in a time-consuming
analysis [8, 9, 71, 87, 92, 93, 97]. The value for Co is low for
NFFs in MCC when a system utilizes minimal resources to
analyze network traffic packets [62, 85, 88, 91, 95, 96, 98, 100–
102]. The value is moderated by utilizing resources that both
increase nor decrease system performance and throughput in
the computation [16–18, 94, 99].
Storage overhead (So) is ranked high when it does not
have a proper mechanism to store large dispersed network
packets at different locations and devices for several networks
in MCC [8, 71]. Network traffic is mostly monitored and
captured at different network security devices, which suffer
from small buffer space to store large and high-speed data
network packets. However, the value for So is low and
decreases drastically when a dedicated physical resource is
assigned near the cloud to store entire logs of the network
traffic [16–18, 87, 92–96]. Such store logs can be further
sent to forensic servers placed in the cloud for investigation
depending on the architectural framework ofNFFs tomanage
high network traffic in the disseminated networks of MCC.
Accuracy of NFFs in MCC is calculated by separating
irrelevant data from large amounts of network traffic. The
accuracy of NFFs is high when network traffic is filtered
to investigate the rest of the traffic; otherwise, the accuracy
is low. Network traffic that enters the network incorporates
two types of data traffic, namely, normal and abnormal
or infected data traffic [16]. NFIs are highly concerned
about abnormal data traffic because it contains evidence on
attacks and the behavior of attackers. Reducing or separating
normal data traffic from abnormal data traffic increases
accuracy and helps investigators perform their investiga-
tion on a specific network traffic with minimal time delay
[16].
However, many NFFs [18, 71, 87, 94, 97, 102] capture
the entire network data traffic and thus result in delays
and decline of system performance. To overcome these
problems, an investigation must be performed on relevant
data depending on the situational requirements. Extracting
relevant data is also a challenging task for NFIs, particularly
in high-speed data rate networks of MCC.
Consequently, the accuracy attribute valuewill be high for
NFFs if the maximum level of irrelevant data is separated,
such as separating normal data traffic from abnormal data
traffic, without utilizing additional resources and reducing
systemperformance [16, 98].The easiestmeans is to use cloud
computational resources because these are computation-
intensive and have more processors to execute the process
rapidly. However, the value of NFFs is marked low when NFI
is performed on the entire network traffic found on various
networks links; this condition ultimately results in timedelays
and reduced system performance [18, 71, 87, 94, 97, 102]. The
value is marked moderate when network traffic is reduced,
allowing for the analysis of an attacker’s behavior within
a reasonable range of time delay and system performance
[8, 9, 17].
Complexity attribute ofNFFs illustrates the problem faced
by NFIs in conducting network forensic investigations in the
MCC environment. The network forensic process consists of
sequential steps performed in the current network infrastruc-
ture. Such steps include collection, examination, analysis, and
reporting [48]. Current NFFs also incorporate architectural
implementation complexity in MCC because of its proposed
frameworks.These frameworks have to be adaptive for several
networks in MCC to reduce the complexity faced by NFIs.
However, adapting current NFFs inMCC is a challenging
task. The process must be flexible in terms of virtualization
and distributed characteristics of MCC. In addition, the
mobility characteristics of data in clouds have increased
the complexity of tracking, collecting, and analyzing such
data. Several types of network positioning, such as cloud
access, data center, and intercloud networks, also affect the
complexity of current NFFs. Thus, the complexity of current
NFFs is high in collecting [18, 88, 96, 100], analyzing [9, 17,
18, 62, 87, 88, 91–102], and investigating network data [16] as
well as in the implementation of NFFs in MCC [8, 18, 62, 71,
85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97].
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Privacy is one of the important factors that divert users
toward MCC. Smartphone users execute and store data
in clouds to protect their data from various attacks. User
data reach cloud resources by passing through cloud access,
data center, and intercloud networks. Network positioning
in MCC becomes a battlefield for NFIs in extracting evi-
dence against various attackers [56]. However, confiden-
tial user information could become compromised while
accessing several networks of MCC. The possibility of user
privacy being compromised makes users hesitant to use
MCC.
A win-win solution must be established for current NFFs
so as not to compromise user privacy while performing
investigation on several network positions inMCC.The value
of privacy is high for NFFs when user data are not accessed
during an investigation; however, this condition remains a
challenge, particularly in MCC [99]. The value of the privacy
attribute is moderate when some user data are accessed
during the investigation [8, 9, 17, 96–98]; the value is low
when user data are accessed during the investigation inMCC
[16, 18, 62, 71, 87, 88, 93–95, 100–102].
Adaptability parameter can show whether current NFFs
are applicable for network positions in MCC or not because
of certain constraints. MCC networking has diversified into
current networks as a result of its connectivity to millions of
servers, capability to transfer trillions of packets per second,
stateless computing, dynamic application provisioning and
positioning, and virtualized features [107]. MCC networks
have to redefine their features to improve their management,
scalability, and administrative aspects compared with current
NFFs.
However, the adaptability of current NFFs must be
measured from the perspective ofMCCgiven its architectural
framework, scalability, privacy, accuracy, complexity, over-
heads, and implementation aspects. These requirements can
be met by identifying the differences between current and
MCC networks to improve current NFFs with value-added
features and make them adaptive for MCC networks. None
of the current NFFs is completely adaptable to the MCC
network because of the different operational requirements
and on-demand services ofMCC [8, 88, 94, 98, 102].The value
of the adaptability attribute is defined as “difficult,” “low,”
and “moderate” in Table 6. Compatibility between NFFs and
MCC networks is nearly impossible to achieve (difficult), but
with a few changes in the frameworks and added features,
the possibility could improve (moderate) [16]. Nevertheless,
adaptability values are marked low when compatibility is
between difficult and moderate; this condition reveals the
need for major changes to adapt to MCC networks. In most
cases, NFFs lack scalability [8, 71, 87, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97],
accuracy [62, 85, 88, 91–93, 95, 96, 99–101], and privacy to
enhance their adaptability to MCC networks [85, 91, 92].
4.2. Analysis of Existing Network Forensics Frameworks to
MCC. This section presents a comprehensive analysis of
existingNFFs in terms of their adaptability toMCCnetworks.
Current NFFs are investigated based on the selected evalua-
tion parameters discussed in Section 4.1.
4.2.1. Traceback Based Forensics Frameworks to MCC. The
network forensic evidence acquisition (NFEA) framework
[71] lacks scalability in terms of MCC because of packet cap-
turing at edge routers in current networks. Identifying edge
routers is difficult inMCC because of the seamless connectiv-
ity provided by CSPs to cloud users [108]. Determining and
accessing the appropriate edge router are challenging tasks
for network forensics in MCC. Moreover, computational
overhead is high because a three-phase encoding scheme that
collects, encrypts, and marks each packet at the edge router
is utilized. This scheme requires computational resources to
perform encoding for a large number of network packets,
especially in MCC. Computational resources are managed
in the cloud and accessed through the pay-as-you-go service
model. Storage overhead is also high because no technique
is incorporated to manage high network traffic. Storage
resources in the cloud are utilized to store large numbers of
marked network packets. However, payment is required to
access the services and resources of computational clouds;
thus, utilizing cloud resources is expensive. Accuracy is
also low in terms of MCC because NFEA employs a flow-
based selection marking scheme to categorize network traffic
based on IP attributes [109]. However, network traffic is
reduced, resulting in efficient management of large data in
MCC. NFEA frameworks are highly complex in terms of
implementation. Applying a three-step encoding scheme for
each network packet at various network locations in the
cloud is difficult. The privacy attribute is low because each
packet is captured and marked at the router, which discloses
important information on users instead of the attacker.
Consequently, reliability decreases, and the number of users
is reduced. In conclusion, adapting the NFEA framework
for MCC networks is difficult given the abovementioned
problems.
Lightweight IP traceback scheme (LWIP) [9] incorpo-
rates horizontal scalability with an increasing number of hop
counts. Each router inserts a TTL value in the packet field
to simplify the investigation process. Large networks have
numerous routers that receive packets by setting the TTL
value. This feature of LWIP is scalable enough for MCC
networks but results in a high computational overhead as a
result of analyzing the packetswith the tree analysis algorithm
utilized by LWIP. The analysis requires time frames with
computational resources and thus increases the computa-
tional overhead, particularly with trillions of packets flowing
through MCC networks. Storage overhead is at a moderate
level because LWIP only stores packet information in terms of
a packet package, which is utilized to tally with IP addresses.
A router only marks the TTL field of the packet and does not
store it. LWIP is also moderately accurate because it involves
a filtration step to remove irrelevant packets and only mark
packets that are a threat. LWIP complexity is high in the
analysis phase ofMCC because of the tree analysis algorithm.
The algorithm requires sufficient packets to reconstruct the
path with more time frames, which is difficult because of
the seamless connectivity and real-time incidence response
requirement in MCC [110]. LWIP reaches a moderate level of
privacy because of the marking of packets at the TTL field
rather than at the payload field. All these constraints make
14 The Scientific World Journal
Table 6: Analysis of network forensics frameworks in context of adaptability to MCC.
Frameworks Scalability Overhead Accuracy Complexity Privacy Adaptability
Computational Storage
Traceback
NFEA [71] N/A H H L IM L N/A
LWIP [9] HT H M M AL M D
Scalable NF [16] VT L L H IV L M
HB-SST [85] HT M N/A N/A IM N/A D
ITP [8] N/A H H M IM M D
Converge
networks
PBNF [87] N/A H L L IM, AL L D
VoIP-NFDE [88] N/A M M N/A IM, CL, AL L D
VoIPEM [62] HT M M N/A IM, AL L N/A
Intrusion
detection system
AIDF [91] HT M M N/A IM, AL N/A D
DFITM [92] HT H L N/A IM, AL N/A D
IIFDH [93] N/A H L N/A AL L D
NFIDA [94] N/A L L L IM, AL L D
Attack graph
SA [95] HT M L N/A AL L L
MLL-AT [96] N/A M L N/A IM, CL, AL M L
AGFE [97] N/A H M L IM, AL M D
FCM [98] HT M M H AL M M
CSBH [17] HT L L M AL M H
AGVI [99] HT L N/A N/A AL H M
Distribution
ForNet [100] VT M M N/A CL, AL L M
DRNIFS [101] BT M M N/A AL L L
DCNFM [102] HT M M L CL, AL L L
DNF-IA [18] HT L L L IM, CL, AL L M
Scalability: HT: horizontal; VT: vertical; BT: both; N/A: not applicable.
Overhead: H: high; M: moderate; L: low; N/A: not applicable.
Accuracy: H: high; M: moderate; L: low; N/A: not applicable.
Complexity: IM: implementation; AL: analysis; CL: collection; IV: investigation.
Privacy: H: high; M: moderate; L: low; N/A: not applicable.
Adaptability: D: difficult; H: high; M: moderate; L: low; N/A: not applicable.
the LWIP framework difficult to be adapted for the MCC
network.
Scalable network forensics strategy (scalable-NF) [16]
adopts vertical scalability resulting from the improved com-
putational power of the forensics server because only infected
traffic is investigated. MCC network data can be investigated
by analyzing only infected network packets rather than the
traffic flows of the entire network. However, the computa-
tional overhead is low because of the training phase that
generates a normal behavior profile from network traffic
through probabilistic inference. Such generation requires
computational resources that can be extracted with MCC
resources in the cloud. A normal behavior profile contains
a set of features with their values that can be stored in dif-
ferent storage resources provided by MCC. Thus, the storage
overhead for scalable-NF is low in MCC. The accuracy of
scalable-NF is high because infected packets are separated
from normal packets, which is favorable for MCC networks.
However, the complexity level is high because random
moonwalk algorithm is employed in forensics investigation.
This algorithm regards the directed host graph as an input
and then investigates attack edges. Generating attack graphs
and identifying attack edges are difficult in MCC given
its virtualized and distributed environment with frequent
service and data migration [2]. The privacy parameter is low
in MCC because network traffic is divided into normal and
attack traffic (infected), both of which require a thorough
analysis of the packets. Therefore, scalable-NF can adapt
to MCC networks by improving the analysis phase and
increasing the privacy of user data.
Hopping-based spread spectrum technique (HB-SST)
[85] provides horizontal scalability in spreading a spectrum
over a number of nodes. Large networks can utilize this
technique through secure dispersion of spread codes in both
time and frequency domains. The computational overhead is
moderate owing to the sending of pseudonoise codes with
a large number of packets in large networks, particularly in
MCC. Computational overhead can be reduced by utilizing
MCC resources according to the demand. However, imple-
menting such a framework in MCC is complex because of
the use of pseudocodes in high-speed data rate networks
that connect data centers, servers, and network devices in
different clouds. In MCC, data migrate within numerous
devices that require a quick responsewhen an attack occurs in
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real time.However, storage, accuracy, and privacy parameters
are inapplicable to MCC networks because there are no
concerns over the storage and reduction of data in HB-SST.
Therefore, adapting this technique toMCCnetwork positions
is extremely difficult.
IP traceback protocol (ITP) [8] lacks scalability because
of its architectural implementation. ITP has a high compu-
tational overhead owing to the large message passing among
system, router, data base, and attack analysis managers. Such
message passing among various managers increases network
latency utilization, which further increases the overall inves-
tigation time. The router manager detects an attack packet
sent to the sinkhole router that stores and sends it to the
system manager. This process creates high storage overhead
at the sinkhole router and causes a bottleneck vulnerable
to attacks. Each packet is treated at more than one place,
resulting in high complexity, particularly for a large network
infrastructure such as MCC. Complexity increases when
trillions of packets enter the network. Each router then
performs static functions, such as hashing, compressing,
storing, and diverting packets toward the sinkhole router.
ITP is moderately accurate because data are stored in a
compressed hash table format by applying filtering to remove
irrelevant data. ITP privacy is at amoderate level because only
packet headers are targeted for investigation. An attacker can
use packet headers to attack networks by altering different
packet fields inside the packet. Therefore, adapting ITP for
MCC networks with the current proposed framework is
difficult.
4.2.2. Adaptability of Converge Network Based Forensics
Frameworks to MCC. Pattern-based network forensics
(PBNF) [87] incorporates limited scalability because of its
framework implementation. The computational overhead
is high because evidence is collected from different sensors
installed before VoIP components and network forensic
analysis tools are utilized to collect raw network traffic data.
Collecting such data and sending them to a centralized
forensics server consume network bandwidth and creates
traffic load at the server. Analysis is performed in real time,
and high bandwidth is required to generate an incident
response at runtime. Collecting data also requires high
storage capacity. PBNF stores voice data at numerous
locations but still requires sufficient storage space to address
large amounts of data in MCC. Cloud storage resources are
suitable for storing voice data that can be further investigated
by a forensics server. Thus, the storage overhead generated
by capturing voice data in MCC is low for PBNF. Voice
data are captured and analyzed for different attack patterns;
this procedure decreases user communication privacy. The
privacy factor is low for PBNF because the voice packets of a
user are monitored and investigated at different locations in
a converged network.The complexity level is high in terms of
implementation and analysis because data are captured from
multiple locations, the monitoring scheme is inefficient, and
large volumes of data are analyzed. Thus, the adaptability of
PBNF is ranked as difficult for networks in MCC given the
aforementioned limitations.
VoIP network forensic analysis with digital evidence
procedure (VoIP-NFDE) [88] lacks scalability because of
the deployed analysis method. However, the computational
overhead is moderate in terms of differentiating normal
from abnormal packets in VoIP network traffic. Such differ-
entiation of packets requires computational resources that
can be obtained from MCC on a pay-per-demand basis.
The computational overhead in traditional networks is high
because of the lack of computational resources; however, the
computational overhead in the MCC network infrastructure
can be reduced by utilizing cloud resources. Comparing
trillions of packets per second at multiple locations in MCC
requires a large storage capacity for the storage of captured
network data without losing their integrity. VoIP-NFDE
has a moderate level of storage overhead because MCC
storage resources are utilized at a financial cost. Furthermore,
network traffic is not reduced by filtering; thus, the VoIP-
NFDE framework in MCC lacks accuracy. The complexity
of this method’s implementation, collection, and analysis in
MCC is high because of the static nature of the framework.
The privacy level is low because differentiating the packets to
expose malicious ones increases the risk of leaking out user
information. Thus, VoIP-NFDE is difficult to adapt to large
and fast disseminated networks of MCC.
The VoIP evidence model (VoIPEM) [62] contains hor-
izontal scalability in terms of collecting information from
different VoIP components in a converged network. The
model can be utilized for large network infrastructures by
providing information from various VoIP components at the
cost of high complexity in implementation and analysis as
well as low privacy of user data. Implementation complexity
results from the synchronization of VoIPEM modules that
collect and send information to generate an evidencemodule.
Analysis complexity is high because of the different scenarios
inferred from forward and backward chaining performed by
S-TLC modeling. The computational overhead is moderate
because evidence from attack scenarios is generated through
S-TLC. However, storage space is required to store infected
packets, from which a hypothesis is formulated to identify
unknown attacks. VoIPEM lacks a proper storagemechanism
for traditional networks; however, the model can use the
storage resources of the MCC infrastructure. Moreover,
VoIPEMdoes not focus on reducing any type of network data.
Hence, its accuracy is inapplicable to both traditional and
MCC networks. VoIPEM should thus improve its strategies
on computational overhead, accuracy, and privacy to become
adaptable for MCC networks.
4.2.3. Adaptability of Intrusion Detection Systems Based
Forensics Frameworks to MCC. Analytical intrusion detec-
tion framework (AIDF) for distributive IDS [91] includes
horizontal scalability in terms of distributed IDS to detect
intrusions by generating attack alert messages. AIDF per-
forms by inhibiting negative behavior in which an attack
is detected as distributive but fails to report a message.
AIDF scalability can be heightened in MCC by installing
IDS at various locations in the network to detect mali-
cious behavior in network packets. Enhanced scalability
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increases complexity in MCC because of the installation
of distributive IDS sensors, collection of attack patterns,
and real-time performance analysis. However, AIDF has a
moderate computational overhead because of its probabilistic
inference that identifies hidden undetected attack patterns for
better forensics explanation. Probabilistic inference increases
delays when an ignorant sensor identifies matching signature
rules from its neighboring sensors. The method incorporates
storage overhead because of its storage requirement at the
distributed IDS, large network traffic at specific sensor nodes,
and storing of network traffic of all sensor nodes at the
central location. The AIDF storage overhead with regard
to all sensor nodes is at a medium level and high when
a single sensor handles a large amount of network traffic.
However, the storage overhead can be minimized by using
MCC storage resources. Accuracy and privacy parameters
are inapplicable to AIDF because it does not reduce network
traffic for investigation and employs probabilistic inference
for analysis.Therefore, adapting toMCC networks is difficult
for AIDF given its existing infrastructure.
An intrusion tolerance system for modeling and ana-
lyzing dynamic forensics system (DFITM) was proposed in
[92].The system achieves horizontal scalability by employing
two servers to receive packets. Scalability is increased by
installing more forensic servers to analyze infected packets
for legal evidence in MCC. However, DFITM has a high
computational overhead because it employs a formalized
method to investigate network packets. DFITM results in
more time delays and requires computational resources,
especially in a network that contains thousands of nodes, such
as MCC. The storage overhead is low as a result of storing
network traffic in a normal server and the use of infected
network packets in a shadow server to storemalicious packets
that were investigated to identify the origin of the attack.
Storage overhead can be minimized by using MCC storage
resources to store all infected packets without overwriting
them. However, DFITM has high complexity in terms of
its implementation and analysis in the MCC context. The
system employsmultiple steps to perform analysis. Such steps
include generating a security report through the shadow
server; the report is sent to the evidence collector and
further partitioned, encrypted, and replicated in various
evidence databases. Accuracy and privacy are inapplicable
to MCC because network traffic is not reduced and the
analysis of network packets results in the lack of user privacy.
Assessing thousands of nodes, large network channels, and
trillions of packets per second as well as the virtualization
environment ofMCC limit the adaptability of DFITM to such
an environment.
Intrusion investigation framework with data hiding
schemes (IIFDH) [93] lacks scalability because of its archi-
tectural framework. A monitoring module is utilized to
monitor trace log files altered by attackers. In MCC, the
framework requires numerous monitoring modules because
of the millions of trace log files present at disperse locations.
IIFDH also lacks accuracy because it does not filter network
traffic and consequently increases delays. The framework
has a low computational overhead for traditional networks
and a high computational overhead for MCC networks. In
MCC, additional working processes are required to embed
log sources, trace log files, perform stenography, monitor
alteration in the traces, and create backup files in log backups
for numerous locations. The storage overhead is high for
traditional networks and low for MCC networks. Storing
original trace log files in log backups can be easily performed
through cloud storage resources. IIFDH has high complexity
because of the stenography performed on trace log files by
changing the least significant bit. This task can be more
challenging in MCC, which can have millions of log files at
numerous locations in the cloud. Privacy is low for user data
inMCCbecausemonitoring log files can leak out confidential
user data. Therefore, IIFDH is difficult to implement for
MCCnetworks because of the nonscalable framework, lack of
accuracy, minimal privacy, and high computational overhead
of the employed framework.
Network forensics based on intrusion detection analysis
(NFIDA) [94] lacks scalability because of its architecture,
such as the use of network evidence-capturing engine and
network forensics analysis engine. These engines work in
sequence to produce digital evidence based on log messages
and network data. The engines can be disadvantageous
to large networks that require real-time investigation of
high-speed data rate network traffic at various locations in
the cloud. NFIDA has a high computational overhead in
traditional networks as a result of its encryption method
during both network data and log message capturing. In
MCC, the computational overhead can be reduced by using
computation-intensive resources for encryption. The storage
overhead is high in a traditional network owing to the
network traffic burden on the centralized network foren-
sics analysis engine. The network forensics analysis engine
receives log messages and network traffic. Nevertheless, the
storage overhead in MCC can be minimized by using storage
resources to store log messages and network data. NFIDA
has low accuracy because it omits irrelevant data through
the network forensics analysis engine. Moreover, NFIDA is
complex due to its implementation and analysis phase in
MCC. User data privacy is low in NFIDA because packets
have to be investigated using the network forensic analysis
engine. Making NFIDA adaptable to the MCC network
infrastructure is difficult. NFIDA has to be modified in terms
of its scalability, accuracy, and privacy before it can be applied
to MCC networks.
4.2.4. Adaptability of Attack Graphs Based Forensics Frame-
works toMCC. Scalable analysis approach (SA) [95] achieves
high horizontal scalability in terms of addressing large
amounts of raw security traffic. SA can address millions of
nodes present in a network by determining their timespan
distribution and dependency on one another. However,
in a traditional framework, SA has a high computational
overhead, such as timespan distribution and probabilistic
temporal attack graph that requires computational resources
to generate computation results for attack modeling. How-
ever, the computational overhead can be reduced by assigning
cloud resources. SA has a medium-level storage overhead
in traditional networks when the attack and dependency
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graphs increase; a portion of the graphs is stored on the disk
rather than in the main memory. The storage overhead can
be also minimized by storing a portion of the graphs on
cloud storage resources.The complexity of SA inMCC is high
whenmillions of nodes are addressed because the virtualized
and distributed setup creates difficulties in analyzing various
attack paths in the attack graphs. SA compatibility is low in
terms of its adaptability to MCC, and the accuracy factor
is inapplicable because the entire network is focused on
creating the attack graph. The framework of SA requires
modification with regard to accuracy and complexity prior
to its application to MCC networks.
Network attack modeling based on multilevel and layer
attack tree (MLL-AT) [96] lacks scalability and has a medium
level of computational overhead in terms of constructing
attack sequences composed of various single attacks. MLL-
AT requires computational resources to determine attack
sequences and can use cloud resources in the case of MCC.
The model has low storage overhead because it only stores
attack sequences; storage overhead can be easily minimized
by using the storage resources of MCC. Data are not reduced
for evaluation and modeling; thus, accuracy is inapplicable
to both traditional and MCC networks. MLL-AT has high
complexity in terms of implementation, collection, and anal-
ysis to address attack sequences in attack trees. MLL-AT is
more complex inMCCbecause it locates risk values for attack
sequences, which can be difficult because millions of nodes
are present in the MCC network. The method has a medium
level of privacy because it has minimal access to user data
given that it only identifies the attack sequence. Such privacy
level is acceptable for MCC users who wish to keep their
information safe from investigators. MLL-AT has a low level
of adaptability to MCC with its current framework setup.
However, it can be enhanced by modifying its strategies to
increase its accuracy and reduce its complexity so that it can
be applicable to MCC.
Attack graph for forensic examination (AGFE) [97] lacks
the scalability factor because it inserts anti-forensics nodes
in the attack graph; this condition results in sophistication
owing to the incorporation of anti-forensics nodes into
millions of nodes for large networks, such asMCC. AGFE has
a high computational overhead because it inserts antiforen-
sics nodes into the attack graph to trace out unexploited
attack behavior. Antiforensics nodes are inserted into the
attack graph that incorporates computational overhead as a
result of the dependency among various nodes. In MCC,
a cloud integrates millions of nodes connected with high
data rate network links; millions of packets are transferred
per second. To trace such nodes, antiforensics nodes should
be sufficiently powerful to trace high-speed data rate traffic
within the seamless and virtualized connectivity provided by
MCC. An antiforensics database also involves overhead that
can be solved by utilizing the storage resources of MCC. In
addition, AGFE reduces the number of network nodes that
are not utilized in the forensics examination. AGFE results in
low accuracy because not enough network traffic is filtered.
Complexity is high in terms of implementation and analysis
stages because of the insertion of the antiforensics nodes
and the determination of interdependency among network
nodes in MCC. Privacy in AGFE is at the maximum level
because investigators are provided access to data. However,
the method lacks scalability; otherwise, it is highly adaptive
to MCC networks.
Fuzzy cognitive map (FCM) [98] achieves horizontal
scalability by reducing a large number of attack paths to
identify the worst one. FCM is useful for MCC, which
has a wide range of network links that connect millions of
resources. In MCC, the large number of network nodes and
paths has to be reduced to identify the worst attack paths
in the network and consequently help investigators in their
investigation. FCM minimizes the number of attack paths
through a genetic algorithm (GA) that identifies the worst
attack paths in an attack graph generated for the network.
FCM analyzes only relevant attack paths and thus increases
accuracy in identifying the worst attack paths in MCC. FCM
has a medium-level computational and storage overhead
because it employs fuzzy cognitive map processing and stores
attack graphs for the network.These attack graphs are further
utilized to investigate the worst attack paths in the network.
FCM can reduce both computational and storage overhead
by using MCC computational and storage resources that are
lacking in traditional networks. However, the complexity of
FCM is high because of its analysis phase for MCC. The
method generates cognitive maps by developing concepts
and casual influence for large network nodes; this condition
makes the entire process extremely complex. In addition,
FCS has a medium level of privacy because user data are not
observed and only attack nodes are targeted to develop attack
graphs. Such privacy level is suitable for MCC networks to
keep user data confidential from third-party investigators.
Overall, FCM is adaptive to MCC networks; however, its
complexity must be minimized further, particularly when
worst attack paths are investigated in real-time scenarios.
Probabilistic approach to identify cost-benefit security
hardening (CBSH) [17] incorporates horizontal scalability
to perform risk assessment of nodes in large networks. The
objective is to determine the cause of an attack in large net-
works with a large number of nodes. The scalability of CBSH
is applicable to the disseminated network of MCC because it
assesses risks to identify the cause of an attack. CBSH has low
computational and storage overheads because of the appli-
cation of probabilistic method to perform risk assessment
for the cause of the attack without storing an entire network
node for investigation. Computation-intensive resources are
employed to perform probabilistic inferences, and storage
resources are utilized to store targeted attack nodes. However,
CBSH accuracy is ranked as medium in the MCC aspect
because it fails to reduce all the irrelevant network nodes
while performing probabilistic inferences. Privacy is also
ranked as medium because it investigates target attack nodes
without inferring user data, which increases confidentiality
and privacy for users. CBSHemploys analysis phase complex-
ity by performing cost-benefit security hardening for large
disseminated networks in MCC.Thus, CBSH is applicable to
MCC networks; however, reducing unwanted network nodes
is necessary for the model to perform real-time probabilistic
inferences and produce a quick incident response to various
queries.
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Visualization and interaction framework for attack
graphs (AGVI) [99] contains horizontal scalability in terms
of visualizing attack nodes for large networks and helps inves-
tigators interact with a visualized interface. Such interface
of visualized attack graphs enables investigators to search
for a specific attack path in the attack graphs. Visualization
and interaction are useful for large networks that contain
millions of nodes, especially for MCC. AGVI also provides
a facility for visualizing attack paths between two selected
vertices on an interface and thus helps investigators dur-
ing the investigation process. AGVI complexity is high in
intercloud networks that should generate an attack path
in the network in real-time situations. The model has low
complexity in cloud data center networks.The level of privacy
is high for users in the MCC infrastructure because AGVI
provides visualized attack graphs for infected nodes of the
network rather than accessing user data. However, accuracy
and storage overhead factors are inapplicable to AGVI in
MCC because the network nodes are not reduced and
stored. Therefore, AGVI provides more benefits to service
providers in their visualization of attack paths in MCC
networks.
4.2.5. Adaptability of Distributive Forensics Frameworks to
MCC. Distributed framework (ForNet) [100] follows vertical
scalability in terms of a highly computational forensics server
in MCC. In ForNet, synApps software module is installed
at different network devices to collect network traffic and
send it to the forensics server. The forensics server should
be computation-intensive to investigate network traffic with
a quick incident response in real-time situations. This con-
dition can be easily achieved with related MCC resources.
ForNet has a medium-level computational overhead because
of synApps, which has to be fast enough to cope with fast-
moving network traffic. The framework also has medium-
level storage overhead because network traffic is diverted
toward a centralized forensics server andhas to be stored in its
database for the investigation of various network vulnerabili-
ties. However, ForNet lacks accuracy because it investigates
all network traffic without any reduction through synApps
installed at various locations of the network. The complexity
of ForNet is viewed in MCC as a result of its collection
and analysis phases. Collection is performed with synApps
modules that should be capable of capturing entire network
traffic while preserving its integrity and reliability for sending
to the forensics server. ForNet cannot be applied to collect
network traffic from disseminated parts of MCC and cannot
be investigated centrally by the forensics server because it
causes numerous time delays, low incident responses, and
reduction of the entire system performance. Nevertheless, the
privacy level is low because all network traffic is captured
and investigated centrally by analyzing each of its packets
to identify various vulnerabilities. Capturing all network
traffic fromdispersed network devices and investigating them
centrally is a difficult task. The ForNet framework requires
modification prior to application in MCC networks. ForNet
can be applicable forMCCnetworks if it contains distribution
storage with decentralized analysis of captured network traf-
fic to reduce time delays, provide a quick incidence response,
and increase system performance.
Distributed agent-based real-time network intrusion
forensic system (DRNIFS) [101] employs both horizontal
and vertical scalability. Horizontal scalability is achieved by
installing network agents at the sensitive areas of a large
network. Vertical scalability is achieved by providing a highly
computational forensics server at disseminated locations.
DRNIFS helps collect network traffic from dispersed areas
in MCC and provides a quick incident response for queries
by performing investigation at various forensics servers.
However, DRNIFS has medium-level computational and
storage overheads in terms of collecting and storing data
that are to be further investigated to identify malicious
behavior and reconstruct various attacks. DRNIFS includes
log and audit data, network traffic, and a historical network
ofmisused patterns.The computational and storage resources
of MCC can be utilized to minimize these overheads and
make DRNIFS adaptive for MCC networks. Collecting and
investigating various types of data result in high complexity
because various data in distributed locations, particularly in
real-time situations, are analyzed. The process is time con-
suming and can delay responses, which are significant in real-
time investigations. Additionally, complete network traffic is
captured and investigated by various forensics servers; thus,
user privacy is reduced. DRNIFS also lacks accuracy in MCC
networks. DRNIFS is partially applicable to MCC networks
and can be improved by enhancing its accuracy and privacy
parameters for network traffic that contains multiple users’
information.
Distributed cooperative network forensics model
(DCNFM) was proposed in [102]. This model implements
horizontal scalability because of its forensics servers. These
servers are distributed in the network, collect network traffic,
and store data from various client agents in a database format.
Several forensics servers are added to the network according
to its requirement. To investigate the same type of network
traffic (e.g., e-mail traffic), only one network forensics server
is required. Although DCNFM can utilize computation-
intensive cloud servers, it requires numerous servers because
of the millions of data resources and high network traffic
in MCC. DCNFM has a medium level of computational
overhead because the process involves multiple executions,
such as building databases, filtering and dumping traffic
streams, converting traffic streams to a database format,
mining forensics databases, network-surveying, and
visualizing network attacks. The model has storage overhead
because it captures the entire network traffic to reconstruct
the attack behavior. This storage overhead can be easily
addressed in MCC by storing the entire network traffic in
multiple storage resources to prevent the data from being
overwritten. However, capturing the entire network data
reduces the accuracy level of DCNFM in MCC. Nonetheless,
the level of accuracy is medium when the model focuses
on specific types of network traffic, such as email data. This
condition can be achieved at the filter and dump stage of the
DCNFM process. DCNFM is complex because it collects
and analyzes network traffic in MCC. Validation is required
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to show that complete data are captured at various security
devices in MCC networks. Correspondingly, the analysis
performed at multiple locations requires synchronization of
the investigated data at different forensics servers to provide
a quick response to attack queries. The privacy level is low
because entire data are captured and analyzed for malicious
behavior; thus, confidential user data could leak out. As a
result, DCNFM has low adaptability to MCC and has to
improve its accuracy and privacy parameters. Network data
collection must be performed in less time, and investigated
data must be synchronized in the various forensics servers.
Dynamical network forensics framework based on
immune agent (DNF-IA) [18] integrates horizontal scalability
in terms of detector agents distributed in the network.
Detector agents are spread across the network to collect
network traffic and forward it to the forensics server. The
number of detector agents varies depending on the network’s
requirement. This feature can be useful to MCC in locating
detector agents in the sensitive area where network data
must be recorded. The number of detector agents depends
on the size of the network. The framework has medium-level
storage overhead in traditional networks because network
traffic is stored locally at various detector agents. However,
DNF-IA can minimize the storage overhead by utilizing
the storage resources of MCC. Similarly, computational
overhead is also high in traditional networks because a single
forensics server has to investigate millions of packets and
send a quick incident response.The abundant computational
resources of computational clouds canminimize the problem
through fast analysis and investigation with quick incident
responses. DNF-IA lacks accuracy because the entire
network traffic is captured and recorded and data are not
filtered; thus, DNF-IA is time consuming and problematic,
particularly in MCC. DNF-IA has low privacy because it
analyzes network traffic captured from various detector
agents installed at disseminated locations of the network.
The model investigates each network packet by identifying
malicious codes that can violate user privacy through
access to the packets. The complexity of DNF-IA in MCC
is the result of the implementation of detector agents and
collection of network traffic from various MCC networks.
When, where, and how detector agents should be placed in
MCC to capture complete and accurate network traffic have
yet to be determined. Collecting complete network packets
while preserving their integrity at disseminated locations in
the MCC network is also an important task for CSPs; this
task has to be verified and validated. Overall, DNF-IA could
be made applicable to MCC network investigation; however,
its functionality must be enhanced to increase accuracy and
privacy for network traffic with improved real-time incident
responses. Table 6 provides a comparison of current NFFs
based on their adaptability to MCC.
NFFs must be modified in terms of their architecture
by incorporating different modules and embedding differ-
ent strategies prior to their adoption in MCC networks.
NFF frameworks generally have computational and storage
overheads because of the high-speed data rate and large
network traffic in current networks [8, 9, 71, 87, 92, 93, 97].
Additionally, NFIs require computation-intensive resources
to investigate trillions of network packets in MCC because of
the high bandwidth, real-time application support, advanced
technologies, and various cloud services provided by MCC
to their users. Capturing large amounts of network traffic
requires a huge storage space to log network packets to be
investigated for malicious behavior through different NFFs
[16, 63, 98]. Utilizing cloud resources, such as computa-
tional and storage resources, can overcome these problems.
The accuracy parameter also serves a vital function in the
compatibility of current NFFs with MCC networks. Filtering
large amounts of network traffic data allows NFIs to readily
analyze the specific data and identify digital evidence against
an attacker. The accuracy value is low in most NFFs. This
condition shows that NFFs lack a filtering mechanism to
reduce network traffic during an investigation and make
NFFs adaptable for MCC networks [18, 71, 87, 94, 97,
102]. Incorporating a filtering mechanism into the existing
architecture of NFFs to handle high-speed data rate and
high network traffic in MCC is the most important factor
in determining the adaptability of NFFs to MCC. The com-
plexity of NFFs lies in their implementation, collection, and
analysis. Implementing current NFFs for MCC networks is
subject to constraints in architectural mismatch, scalability,
accuracy, and privacy [8, 18, 62, 71, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94,
96, 97]. The entire system is made sophisticated to produce
an efficient output for investigating digital evidence in the
various networks of MCC. The collection phase of NFFs
does not guarantee complete capturing of network traffic
and validation and verification of its integrity [18, 88, 96,
100, 102]. Capturing the entire network traffic at various
network locations is important in determining the origin of
the attack and the attack behavior. The analysis phase for
various NFFs involves investigating the entire network traffic
captured from the network and results in numerous time
delays with less incident responses to investigation queries
[9, 17, 18, 62, 87, 88, 91, 95, 99, 101]. This problem can be
minimized by assigning distributed computation-intensive
servers at various locations in the cloud. Furthermore, many
NFFs lack privacy, which is important for MCC to gain users’
trust [16, 18, 62, 71, 87, 88, 93–95, 100–102]. Privacy is low
when network traffic logs are accessed; access to traffic logs
involves access to other user information in the network,
which is against the characteristics of MCC. An intelligent
framework requires a multitenant environment of MCC to
protect user data from being exploited.
In conclusion, NFFs’ computational and storage overhead
problems can be solved by utilizing the abundant resources of
computational clouds. With these resources, NFFs can store
network logs in storage resources and utilize computation-
intensive resources to investigate network traffic. Similarly,
the scalability of NFFS can be increased by capturing,
examining, storing, preserving, and analyzing network traffic
at disseminated locations in resource-rich computational
clouds. Machine learning and data mining techniques should
be incorporated to retrieve relevant data to trace the origin of
the attacker and his/hermalicious activity.Thus, the accuracy
of NFFs in MCC can be increased. Complexity would also
be reduced if the aforementioned suggestions and solutions
are adopted for NFFs in the context of MCC. User privacy
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can be increased by adopting artificial intelligence techniques
to extract specific user data that have to be investigated
accordingly. Such techniques help NFFs become adaptive to
MCC networks and identify different vulnerabilities in the
network. CSPs will also benefit from the use of current NFFs
with slight modifications; FaaS can be provided to users, and
additional revenue can be generated.
As discussed earlier, the adaption of existingNFF inMCC
is challenging primarily due to the restricted access to the
data. It implies thatNFF adaption inMCCmust depend upon
predictive analysis and techniques of artificial intelligence.
Artificial intelligence can help in the identification of features
that reveal information worthy for analysis. It has been
shown that artificial intelligence can be effectively used for
information gathering from the distributed networks of the
MCC [111]. Explicitly, Artificial Neutral Networks (ANN) can
be used to analyze network evidence from various databases
and online resources connected through high bandwidth
networks. Beside ANN, Support Vector Machine (SVM) can
be used to find out the patterns in the MCC networks
based upon their classification [112].The SVM trains the data
through various intelligent algorithms to identify patterns
in the network traffic to help classify network traffic into
categories. Furthermore, forensic in MCC can benefit from
swarm intelligence as well [113]. Swarm intelligence can
predict network attacks by modeling bioinspired algorithms
which are designed to solve complex problems. Moreover,
fuzzy logic can also be an option to identify network evidence
in huge distributed networks of MCC [114]. The networked
data in MCC has significantly increased due to steep rise in
mobile users. To tackle the networked data, real-timenetwork
evidence mechanisms demand accurate approximations of
vulnerabilities through fuzzy logic systems. Thus, it has
been observed that existing NFF lacks artificial intelligence
mechanisms, which can assist network forensics in MCC
networks.
5. Issues and Challenges in
Network Forensics for MCC
This section describes unresolved issues and research chal-
lenges in forensics investigation faced byCSPs inMCC.These
issues must be addressed to employ current NFFs in MCC
networks. Current NFFs would remain unsuitable for MCC
infrastructures until robust methods and approaches are
engineered, designed, and incorporated into them. Figure 3
presents the unresolved issues and challenges faced by CSPs
in the MCC environment.
5.1. High Speed Data Network. Effective network forensics
requires capturing, preserving, examining, and analyzing
each event on a single device placed in the entire network
[115]. Network forensics helps reconstruct, analyze, and track
each incident of exploitation in the network. However, the
aforementioned stages are restricted because of the net-
work bandwidth and high-speed data rate in large network
channels of MCC. In MCC, various data centers are linked
with high-speed fiber optics network channels that send
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MCC.
millions of packets per second [69]. Various data centers
link together to form a cloud, which provides services to
users in the form of computation, storage, and others. The
challenge forCSPs is to capturemillions of packets per second
from disseminated locations in the cloud in real time while
preserving data integrity and reliability [116]. CSPs have to
investigate network packets captured at various locations in
the cloud to identify different vulnerabilities and trace the
origin of an attack. CSPs experience difficulty in capturing,
indexing, storing, and analyzing a large number of packets
and producing an incident response to forensic queries in a
time span of less than a second. In several cases, data have to
be retrieved from other clouds; this procedure further delays
the investigation process and reduces the quality of service.
Current network forensic analysis tools are unsuitable
for high-speed data rate network traffic and cannot produce
efficient results in large cloud networks, such as MCC [50–
53].The challenge is to develop an intelligent network forensic
analysis tool that can help CSPs investigate network packets
and ensure that FaaS outputs are provided in real-time
situations for user queries.
5.2. Network Traffic Storage. Large network volumes with
high-bandwidth network channels havemade network foren-
sics investigation complex and challenging, particularly for
MCC networks. MCC is utilized by smartphone users
because of data-related constraints [108], such as, integrity,
security, preservation, consistency, and storage. Smartphone
users send their data to the cloud for storage; they can easily
access and retrieve these data any time [1]. Capturing and
storing digital evidence with the large amount of network
traffic and high-speed data rate in MCC are challenging for
CSPs because all these activities are performed in less than a
second [117]. Storing network traffic requires a proper storage
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mechanism that does not affect data integrity and reliability.
Moreover, storage resources in MCC should be selected in
such a manner that they are readily accessible for retrieving
network logs whenever necessary.
Cloud storage resources minimize the storage overhead
for current NFFs in MCC; however, they increase the com-
plexity of retrieving particular network records from numer-
ous distributed storage databases [118]. Millions of network
packets are considered and stored in the disseminated storage
resources of a cloud; large storage capacity and an optimized
searching algorithm are thus required [119]. Data mining
techniques can be utilized to solve this problem by retrieving
relevant network records from large storage databases that
can be easily investigated for various vulnerabilities [120].
Therefore, cloud storage resources increase the adaptability of
current NFFs to MCC and minimize their storage overhead.
However, much effort is required to formalize the network
traffic storage process in the cloud to produce standardized
and real-time FaaS to MCC users.
5.3. Voice over Internet Protocol-Communication. Smart-
phone users utilize Skype, Viper, and other voice chat appli-
cations to communicate with other users. Such applications
generate VoIP packets, with high priority on quality of
services [121]. VoIP communication must be captured in a
real-time manner during a forensic investigation. Forensics
investigation that checks for latency, jitter, and packet loss has
to be performed dynamically for VoIP traffic to identify the
malicious behavior of voice packets [62].
However, CSPs face difficulties in collecting voice packets
stored in different places and moved from one server to
another in a cloud (e.g., registrar, redirect, location, and
proxy servers) as well as in signaling gateways and billing
systems. Many problems related to the privacy of users arise
when accessing such servers to extract voice packets. These
servers can be in other cloud territories, which restricts
CSPs from investigating voice packets without prior approval
because important user information could leak out and
related privacy related are noted down in SLA. The entire
process is subsequently delayed, and the probability that voice
packets would lose their integrity or would be altered by an
attacker increases [122]. Such constraints create problems for
CSPs to provide full-fledged FaaS in real time to remote users
in the MCC paradigm.
5.4. Multiple Communication Channels. Multiple communi-
cation channels are the paths available to send data from a
mobile device to another destination, such as MCC. These
channels increase the throughput of the network by sending
and receiving data from and to the user at the same time [123].
CSPs face problems during data investigation when the data
are sent from smartphone devices to the cloud using a wire-
less network with multiple communication channels [124].
CSPs do not have complete access to the network between
a smartphone device and the cloud because smartphone
users are generally mobile [125]. To provide FaaS to MCC
users, CSPs must investigate various vulnerabilities present
in cloud access networks, such as the network between
a smartphone user and the cloud. However, CSPs depend on
ISPs and other network service providers to investigate the
cloud access network withmultiple communication channels
open to various network susceptibilities.
Moreover, data pass through multiple communication
channels via more than one network type because of the
mobility of smartphone users. Such an issue produces
additional complexity for investigators to trace smartphone
user connectivity within various networks and perform live
forensics for multiple communication channels. In multiple
communication channels, a network packet is affected by
interference with other wireless networks and results in
incomplete capturing of network packets [126]. Incomplete
capturing of network packets does not provide a complete
picture of the evidence to identify attackers and their attack
behaviors. Consequently, trustworthiness and dependability
are required by CSPs and network service providers to
investigate the situation in real time through the provision of
transparent FaaS to smartphone users in MCC.
5.5. Validation of Network Data. The combination of data
centers forms clouds, which are then assigned by CSPs
to MCC users for the storage and execution of various
applications. Each data center connects with other data
centers through high-speed data rate network channels [69].
Each channel has to transfer millions of packets in a sec-
ond and has to store them in a reliable storage medium
without affecting their integrity. However, network forensics
encounters difficulties in developing integrity and escalation
among distributed network forensic storages in MCC [127].
For instance, user data are stored on two different data centers
at two different clouds via connection through high-speed
network links; verifying validity and integrity while accessing
data scattered between the two different cloud data centers is
challenging.
Data validation is important because forensics investiga-
tion is performed based on data stored in the data center
to identify the origin of the attack and attacker [128]. Each
CSP has to ask permission from other CSPs to investigate
network resources for possible network susceptibilities. This
condition creates problems for CSPs in freely capturing
network evidence from intercloud and other networks in
the cloud. Accessing evidence from an intercloud network
is restricted by cross-border rules or might be delayed by
CSPs by not responding in real time. Sometimes, real-time
data are required for an investigation; however, such data
could also be unavailable in MCC for network forensics [74].
This condition is important for sectors, such as business and
health, where real-time situations with quick and accurate
responses are necessary. Hence, the validation of network
data in cloud computing is a challenge for CSPs in MCC.
5.6. Offloading Application to Multiple Clouds. Highly inten-
sive computational applications in MCC are offloaded for
execution to data centers in the cloud that are geographically
dispersed through high-speed network links [2]. However,
data centers sometimes encounter scarcity of a resource to
execute an application; thus, a portion or an entire application
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is migrated to the nearest available cloud for execution
[1]. Increased application load on a data center causes the
migration of applications to different data centers. This
condition has to be observed in the investigation to identify
various attacks. Hence, CSPs face the tough task of capturing
legal evidence of an offloaded application from each network
link that might not be accessible because of another cloud’s
boundaries. The only means to gain access to the intercloud
network is to obtain legal permission from the CSP, with
the risk of being denied because of user data privacy and
confidentiality issues.
Real-time investigation technique is required to capture
offloaded network packets in other clouds because of the
volatile nature of network traffic. When the link between
clouds is disconnected, network data are lost and tracing back
the origin of the attack becomes difficult without enough
evidence in the network.
5.7. Preservation of Data. Preservation of network data is as
important as collecting, examining, and analyzing network
traffic to obtain legal evidence against an attacker. Preserving
data in the cloud is significant because it provides long-term
continuity and usability of digital records for stored network
data [129]. Preservation helps in future investigations and
can function as a pattern match rule for security devices to
manage various attacks in the future [57]. The challenges
that CSPs face in data preservation in the cloud include data
increase, tendency of data to be lost, changing rules and
regulation, data migration, interoperability in the clouds, and
lack of authenticity verification. CSPs must employ a formal
method to preserve data in the cloud to provide FaaS to the
user on demand [130].
A preservation process is required to ensure the extensive
availability of network traffic and assists in digital auditing,
accessing logs, confidentiality, indexing, data center foot-
prints, security, and high availability. Therefore, advance-
ments in technology guided by legal requirements are
required to preserve network data for network forensics
investigation.
6. Conclusion and Future Directions
This paper discussed the functions, approaches, and struc-
tures of current NFFs. We qualitatively analyzed current
NFFs based on selected evaluation parameters in the context
of their adaptability to MCC. The findings will benefit CSPs
by allowing them to save time and money that might be
spent on reinventing the use of novel NFFs for various MCC
networks. This study provides motivation to users through
newly added services, such as FaaS. Current NFFs involve
computational and storage overhead problems because of
the limited computing potentials of intermediate network
devices. However, MCC utilizes resource-rich computational
clouds that can solve these problems and help existing
NFFs adapt to MCC networks. Similarly, the scalability of
NFFs can be increased by capturing, examining, storing,
preserving, and analyzing network traffic at disseminated
locations in resource-rich computational clouds. Machine
learning and data mining techniques can be incorporated
to retrieve relevant data to be investigated and trace the
origin and malicious activity of the attacker. Doing so
will increase the accuracy of NFFs for MCC. In addition,
complexity will be reduced if the suggestions and solutions
presented in this paper are adapted for NFFs in the context
of MCC. User privacy can also be improved with the use
of artificial intelligence techniques to extract specific user
data that have to be investigated. Such methods help NFFs
become adaptive for MCC networks and identify different
vulnerabilities in the network. CSPs will also benefit from
using current NFFs with slight modifications; FaaS would
be provided to users, and additional revenue would be
generated.
We conclude that new research roadmaps and programs
are required to overcome the issues and challenges faced by
CSPs. Standardized rules, secure reference models, proto-
cols, trust architectures, legal contemplation, technological
development, and a global regularity body should be estab-
lished. These requirements can be achieved by harmonizing
the efforts of industrial experts, academic researchers, and
investigators under legal entity bodies. Thus, the significance
of network forensics will increase gradually and will provide
economical and viable solutions for investigators in identify-
ing digital evidence against attackers in MCC networks.
As a future research direction, network forensics as an
open research area (particularly for MCC networks) has to
be further explored with newly adaptive frameworks that
consider user privacy, data integrity, data confidentiality,
data segregation, and many other factors. However, these
frameworks should be incorporated with newly developed
dynamic cloud-based network forensic tools to cope with the
MCC infrastructure. Similarly, various security threats and
attacks must be identified and studied to achieve optimum
results in MCC network forensics.
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